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Just prior to his untimely death in 1961 in a hospital in the United States of America, 
Franz Fanon taught a series of lectures at the University of Tunis. His lecture notes in-
clude a section titled “Le contrôl et la surveillance”, in which he makes “social diagnoses, 
on the embodied effects and outcomes of surveillance practices on different categories 
of laborers when attempts are made by way of workforce supervision to reduce their 
labor to an automation: factory assembly line workers subjected to time-management 
by punch clocks and time sheets, the eavesdropping done by telephone switchboard su-
pervisors as they secretly listened in on calls”, and other forms of management by sur-
veillance (Browne 2015: 5-6). Here, Fanon produces an original account of control as an 
alienating and dehumanizing force of social production. Importantly for Fanon, technol-
ogies of control also generate and reinforce subjective experiences of racialization as an 
aspect of dehumanization in capitalist modernity. Yet, despite Fanon’s close intellectual 
friendship with Sartre and his involvement with Parisian philosophical circles during the 
postwar period, the emerging generation of French poststructuralist thinkers who be-
came Sartre’s heirs do not seem to have regarded Fanon’s work on control as influential 
upon their groundbreaking theorizations of contemporary power and social production. 
As Simone Browne notes (2015: 165), Foucault does not reference Fanon in his early 
lectures on discipline and affective embodiment in “Madness and Civilization”, delivered 
during his own residency from 1966-68 at the University of Tunis; nor does he cite Fan-
on’s work in his later lecture series on biopolitics and security delivered at the Collège 
de France from 1977 to 1979. Similarly, although Fanon’s critical approach to psychoa-
nalysis is mentioned in passing by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus (1983), Fanon is 
not cited by Deleuze (1988) as a precursor to his subsequent thinking about Foucault’s 
account of “disciplinary society” as a paradigm of modernity.  Deleuze’s “Postscript on 
the Societies of Control”, which Gregory Flaxman (2019) argues should be read as an 
afterword to Deleuze’s earlier book on Foucault, again fails to consider Fanon a relevant 
source of knowledge regarding the nature of those power formations Deleuze believes 
are characteristic of a more contemporary shift towards “societies of control” (Deleuze  
1992).  
 Of course, this is not to say that Deleuze was disinterested in colonialism or racism. 
In fact, a steady stream of scholarship demonstrates the relevance of Deleuzian philoso-
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phy applied to the critique of colonialism and racism, and to the development of antico-
lonial, decolonial or “excolonial” perspectives (see e.g. Bignall/Patton 2010; Bignall 
2010; Patton 2010; Saldanha/Adams 2012; Burns/Kaiser 2012; Bignall 2014). And yet, 
in the Postscript – his most focused articulation of the “control society” – Deleuze’s 
thinking about control as a “new” formation of power “beyond” the disciplinary society 
elaborated by Foucault, ignores and elides colonial racism as an historical feature of a 
globally pervasive form of control. I believe this greatly diminishes the potential of 
Deleuze’s framework for advancing an adequate understanding of the nature of control, 
and is insensitive to the possibilities for active resistance articulated by Indigenous peo-
ples through centuries of colonial domination. Indeed, although Hannah Arendt (1968) 
points to imperialism as a source of the fascist totalitarianism that marks a turning point 
for European political society in the twentieth century, Continental philosophers have 
been typically disinclined to analyze colonization as a fledgling framework for biopoliti-
cal societies of control, including the neoliberal variants theorized by Deleuze. Similarly, 
in the main, they have not been motivated to think much about the imperial and racist 
character of the disciplinary operations undergirding modern power in its paradoxical 
internalization and expulsion – assimilation and elimination – of difference. This elision 
of colonial racism as a formative and persistent element in a nascent politics of disci-
pline and control raises questions about the accuracy of Foucault’s and Deleuze’s ac-
counts of the historical movement from sovereign power to disciplinary modernity to 
biopolitical posthumanism as a global phenomenon of the late twentieth century. My 
aim in this essay is to trouble the temporalization of “control” as a new operation of 
power after “discipline”, since biopolitical elements of a control network appear histori-
cally (and continue today) in imperial technologies of racialization and in settler-
colonial power formations. To illustrate this, I proceed by mapping aspects of European 
imperialism, via the exemplary case of Australian settler-colonialism, onto the three 
thematic divisions – History, Logic and Program – that structure Deleuze’s brief “Post-
script on the Societies of Control” (1992).  
 
History 
One of the most vile and gruesome practices of colonial imperialism involved the theft 
and global trade of Indigenous human remains, resulting in the dispersal of ancestral 
bodies through international collection networks. Indigenous peoples historically fought 
strenuously against the desecration of their dead and sought to protect their ancestors 
and guarantee them proper funerary rites, and Indigenous communities today continue 
to struggle for the repatriation of the remains and belongings of their ancestors from the 
imperial collections of museums erected on their homelands and from institutions in 
  
 
Coils of the Serpent 6 (2020): 111-28 
 
113 Bignall: Colonial Control 
Europe and the United Kingdom (see Fforde/Hubert/Turnbull 2002; Hemming et al. 
2020a, 2020b; Hemming/Wilson 2010). Cressida Fforde explains: 
Collections were amassed from the later years of the eighteenth century until the 
first half of the twentieth century and were compiled to represent skeletally (but 
also sometimes with soft tissue) the different ‘races’ of the world, so that they 
could be measured, compared and analysed to understand human variation and 
origins. Such analysis was undertaken at a time when perceptions of human diver-
sity were deeply rooted in notions of biological determinism and racial worth. 
These notions were themselves entangled within the contemporary colonial ideol-
ogy and practice, supporting, and deriving from, a belief in European superiority. 
(2004: 1; see also Bernasconi 2001) 
The clandestine removal of Indigenous human remains, animal life and other cultural 
property from ancestral Countries1 and communities – typically taken without the con-
sent of Indigenous authorities or kin and very often in secrecy by grave-robbers – oc-
curred in all British settler-colonial societies, but Aboriginal Australian remains were 
“the most highly ‘prized’” (Fforde 2004: 1). This is because, according to the imperial 
imaginary, Indigenous Australians represented the “lowest” scale of humanity; and 
sometimes were considered a form of animal life “below” or “before” humanity. Indige-
nous Australians thus constituted the basis from which all of human life could be com-
pared in a racist hierarchy of ascendency with European man positioned at the apex, 
naturally and without question. The “scientific evidence” for this claim about natural 
European human superiority was supposedly found in the physical differences observa-
ble between Indigenous Australian and European bodies, and especially by the meas-
urement of crania and their surface characteristics, which were taken to indicate relative 
differences in natural intelligence. As forms of “proof” relied upon in the imperial sci-
ence of racism, the skulls and skeletons of Indigenous individuals were highly desirable 
commodities that sold for significant prices on an international market:  
The scientific importance placed on Indigenous human remains, coupled with their 
relative inaccessibility to scholars in Europe and the belief that the Australian 
‘race’ was on the verge of extinction, meant that remains were rare and valuable 
commodities that could be exchanged for a variety of goods and services. (Fforde 
2004: 69) 
As is the case with the European Union’s neoliberal exchange mechanism referred to by 
Deleuze, in this earlier process of commodification, we can see evidence of the way in 
which colonial “control relates to floating rates of exchange, modulated according to a 
                                                        
1 For many Indigenous Australians, as for many Indigenous peoples around the globe, land is inextricably 
connected with all living matter and all Being, in a complex system of consubstantial interdependence and 
continuous co-emergence involving human and nonhuman bodies, minds, spirits, air, sky, water, plant life, 
and ancestral agencies (see e.g. Rose 2000). This relational ontology of interdependence translates (poor-
ly) as the concept of ‘Country’, which is capitalized here to indicate its particular cultural significance.  
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rate established by a set of standard currencies” (Deleuze 2003: 5). Even when they 
were collected by body-snatching or other dubious means, a gift of Indigenous human 
remains to scientific institutions could also bring significant prestige to the donator, 
such as entry to elite scholarly societies. However, as Fforde notes, the “most common 
and tangible rewards that donors received in return for human remains were items of 
scientific literature, and these would have been difficult to obtain by other means in the 
colonies” (2004: 72). For collectors, too, “Indigenous human remains were […] used as 
exchange specimens. Curators of colonial museums used indigenous remains as curren-
cy to enlarge their own collections” (Fforde 2004: 74).   
 The colonial archive details the criminal activities of “an international web of con-
tacts through which human remains were gathered” (Fforde 2004: 2, passim). The bod-
ies or body parts of many Aboriginal Ancestors (or “Old People”) were removed illicitly 
from burial sites. Others were obtained prior to the body receiving funerary rites when 
members of the medical profession removed the deceased from hospital morgues, asy-
lums, prisons, scaffolds, or massacre sites for the purpose of “scientific study”, often 
sending human remains back to institutions in Europe where they had received their 
medical training (Fforde 2004: 44). In my home town of Adelaide, for example, early 
members of the colonial medical establishment included Edward Stirling, Director of the 
Adelaide Museum and Professor of Physiology at Adelaide University; and William Ram-
say-Smith, who was Chairman of the Central Board of Health, City Coroner, Inspector of 
Anatomy and a doctor at the Adelaide Hospital. These powerful men, amongst others, 
occupied privileged positions of access to the bodies of the deceased and became prolific 
suppliers of Aboriginal remains to the collection at the University of Edinburgh, which 
by 1939 had alone accrued “the skulls of over 1660 individuals […] and the remains of at 
least six hundred Aboriginal people” (Fforde 2004: 43). Equally disturbing, these net-
works for the global transport and collection of human dead also involved the participa-
tion of men whose families were complicit with the international trade in human life and 
had accumulated vast wealth from the slave trade. For example, Edward Stirling’s fore-
bear, Archibald Stirling, had received more than £10,000 in compensation from the Brit-
ish Imperial Parliament for his “loss of property” following the abolition of slavery in the 
1830s (see Coventry 2019). 
 Indeed, the “scientific” rationale behind the international trafficking of Indigenous 
human remains was itself linked with a line of enquiry that played a role in the ideologi-
cal justification of slavery, or conversely in arguments for its abolition. Debates concern-
ing the origin and nature of human diversity also influenced the development of policy 
for the “just” treatment and “protection” of Indigenous peoples in the course of Europe-
an and British colonization of Australia, Aotearoa-New Zealand, Canada and the Ameri-
cas. Especially from the seventeenth century, when sea-faring Europeans began to study 
diverse peoples in far-flung regions of the globe, scientific discourse after Kant debated 
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the origins of human difference, with opinion divided “between those who advocated 
unity and those who advocated plurality” (Fforde 2004: 9; see also Bernasconi 2001). 
The classification of humankind through comparative anatomy involved the quantifica-
tion and cataloguing of human differences. For many, in accordance with Christian or-
thodoxy, the aim was to collect evidence for underlying principles of unity that showed 
human difference was the result of environmentally-influenced divergence from a single 
primordial stock. On this view, the various human “races” were all participants in a uni-
versal humanity, and colonization was justified on “humanitarian” grounds that aimed to 
elevate “primitive” Indigenous peoples to a more advanced (European) standard of 
achievement and civilization. However, by the end of the eighteenth century, coinciding 
with the height of global slave trade, there was an increasingly prevalent view that racial 
differences were so great as to indicate separate species of human, springing not from a 
single source but from plural origins. Measurements of racial distinction in the charac-
teristics of human skeletal and tissue remains were used to support scientific assertions 
regarding the “numerous varieties of race” and “proof” of “black inferiority in measure-
ments that apparently demonstrated their smaller brain size” (Fforde 2004: 20). The 
polygenist insistence on incommensurable human diversity springing from multiple 
sources of creation supported claims about the “natural propensity” of the different rac-
es to different kinds of activity: thus, the “inferior black races” were presented by Euro-
pean anatomists as “naturally suited to slavery”, and it was asserted that they would 
eventually die out if emancipated. Biological assimilation was considered by polygenists 
to be racially detrimental, especially to the “superior (European) race” that would be 
degraded by miscegenation. The potential for miscegenation was heavily policed in co-
lonial societies:  Robert Young (1994) has detailed the fastidious taxonomy of race that 
developed in the nineteenth century to discipline and hierarchically categorize the varie-
ties of racial degeneration produced by the mixing of various degrees of “blood quan-
tum”: pureblood, half-caste, quadroon, octoroon, and so forth. 
 From this historical description of colonial racism emerge the contours of a racial-
ized logic of control that is concerned with the quantification and classification of human 
variation. The following section describes aspects of this logic. We will see how the hier-
archical management of race was achieved through the imperial creation of vast infor-
mation networks through which Indigenous human remains were dispersed and ex-
changed as mobile units of currency. Colonial racism is, I suggest, a dark precursor to the 
ascendant logic of control that Deleuze observes arising in the second half of the twenti-
eth century. 
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Logic 
To some extent, the internment of deceased Indigenous individuals as “specimens” in 
imperial museums and universities is an exemplary phenomenon of the modern disci-
plinary society described by Foucault as characteristic of the 18th and 19th centuries. 
Like the prison, the hospital, the factory, the family and the school, such institutions 
were “environments of enclosure”, whose purpose was “to concentrate; to distribute in 
space; to order in time; to compose a productive force” (Deleuze 1992: 3). Likewise, the 
binary operation of racism that distinguishes “white” from “non-white” is a disciplinary 
tool of division that plays an essential role in the maintenance of a colonial order. Racial 
segregation is necessary when social productivity depends upon the expropriation and 
redistribution of Indigenous resources and labor, to profit a ruling class that is constitu-
tively identified as racially elite. Yet, the program of imperial racism driving the collect-
ing impulse displays a logic of control that is different in kind to that of discipline, and 
seems better understood in terms of the political operation Deleuze describes as the 
“progressive and dispersed installation of a new system of domination” (1992: 7). In 
comparison to disciplinary technologies,  
control mechanisms are inseparable variations, forming a system of variable ge-
ometry the language of which is numerical […]. Enclosures are molds, distinct cast-
ings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously 
change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute 
from point to point. (Deleuze 1992: 4) 
Disciplinary racism that works by binary “molds” is different from racialized control, 
which works by “modulation”. Colonial domination often relies upon a binary categori-
zation of “white” and “non-white” bodies to discipline identities in the service of a colo-
nial social order. However, it can also involve colonial control as the mobile positioning 
of bodies across a mutating field of privilege and disadvantage – and of relative levels of 
social enjoyment – that varies according to the intersectionality of identity as 
raced/classed/gendered, and so forth. When colonial racism is denied significance as an 
element of control, then we miss something important about the nature of racism and of 
colonial domination, and furthermore we miss something important about the nature of 
control. 
 The racialized operation of control is described well by Ghassan Hage (1998), who 
depicts Australian racism as a way of managing national space in accordance with the 
hierarchical positioning of bodies across a field of “whiteness”. This enables its complex 
conceptualization, not simply as a binary system of thought opposing the categories of 
“white” and “non-white” and an associated technology informing the development of 
institutions of inclusion and exclusion, such as citizenship; but also as a more informal, 
mobile, everyday practice of micropolitical engagement. Racism in this second sense is a 
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corporeal and affective practice, in which actors perpetually struggle to assert and em-
body a privileged mode of “occupying the nation” that enables them to be “spatially em-
powered to position/remove the other” from the field of enjoyment (Hage 1998: 42).  
Here, nationalism is “a state of the body. It is a way of imagining one’s position within 
the nation and what one can aspire to as a national” (Hage 1998: 45; see also Moreton-
Robinson 2015). Australian settler-colonial nationhood was shaped by the colonial den-
igration of Indigenous peoples and by the “White Australia Policy”, each valorizing 
whiteness as a primary signifier of the cultural capital that is prerequisite for a citizen’s 
enjoyment of the governmental “power to position others within the nation” (Hage 
1998: 65).2 As a valuable form of cultural capital, whiteness creates “differential modali-
ties of national belonging as they are experienced within society” (Hage 1998: 51). The 
modalities of national belonging are differential and mobile because within the system of 
whiteness there exists a hierarchy of cultural capital and associated political entitlement 
determined by the complex interplay between race, gender, class and other factors of 
political identification, which defines gradations of political capacity and enjoyment. 
Those at the top of the whiteness hierarchy will typically also enjoy gender and class 
privileges; differentiations and complex interactions between these categories overlay 
and assist the political distribution of bodies within national space, determining citizens’ 
shifting and differing capacities for social agency and governmental action. When it is 
conceptualized in terms of a strategic distribution of bodies across a field of whiteness, it 
becomes apparent that national belonging and civic enjoyment involves participation 
within a naturalized political order headed by a “national aristocracy”. Such aristocra-
cies “consolidate their power by naturalizing their own topography of the nation: the 
positions that constitute the national field and the capital needed to occupy them” (Hage 
1998: 65). Accordingly, Hage insists: 
A national ideal does not only idealise the position of the dominant within the na-
tion, but also a whole series of positions and the relations between them. It con-
sists of a map of what for the dominant are idealised positions and idealised types 
constituting these positions. That is, the dominant in the national field do not only 
have an ideal of themselves in the field, but also an ideal of all the positions in it, 
that is, an ideal of the field itself which they struggle to impose. (1998: 65-6) 
                                                        
2 Formally titled the Immigration Restriction Act (1901), the “White Australia Policy” was the first legisla-
tive Act of the new Australian Commonwealth. The Attorney-General Alfred Deakin explained in 1901: 
“That end, put in plain and unequivocal terms […] means the prohibition of all alien coloured immigration, 
and more, it means at the earliest time, by reasonable and just means, the deportation or reduction of the 
number of aliens now in our midst. The two things go hand in hand, and are the necessary complement of 
a single policy — the policy of securing a ‘white Australia’.” (Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary 
Debates, Immigration Restriction Bill, Second Reading, 12 September 1901). The Immigration Restriction 
Act remained in place until 1966, when Australia became a signatory to the UN Convention on the Elimi-
nation of all forms of Racial Discrimination and it became apparent that Australia’s new international 
commitments were vastly at odds with its internal system of racist policy. Australia ratified the Conven-
tion in 1975. 
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In the white nationalism of the Australian settler-colonial society, we can discern the 
“operation of a control mechanism, giving the position of any element within an open 
environment at any given instant” (Deleuze 1992: 7). The “science” of racism, developed 
through comparative anatomy in the modern period of colonization, was crucial for the 
development of a graded field of whiteness that circumscribes and monitors differential 
access to political enjoyment within the Australian nation, including by the computation 
and labelling of racialized bodies in terms of blood quanta and degrees of degeneration 
or deficiency in relation to a normative (European) standard of human perfection. Here, 
unlike in the institutional “enclosures” of disciplinary society, “what counts is not the 
barrier but the computer that tracks each person’s position – licit or illicit – and effects a 
universal modulation” (Deleuze 1992: 7). The racialization of bodies and subjectivities 
through the attribution of degrees of whiteness (and relative deficiency or imperfection) 
is a basic element of the grammar employed in “the numerical language of control” 
(Deleuze 1992: 5). We have seen how the movement and placing of Indigenous human 
remains across a global network of collections produced an imperialist databank that 
contributed to the “categorisation of racialised ideas about Aboriginal people and was 
part of a global movement of analysis using the ideologies of eugenics […] concerned 
with racial purity, blood quantum, and hierarchies of race” (Baker 2018: 2). A body’s 
potential for occupation of the category “Indigenous” is constantly modified according to 
calculations of “blood quantum” and gradations of “purity”. 
 For Indigenous peoples, the “active danger” of a colonial control society is “piracy”, 
in the starkest possible manifestation imaginable (Deleuze 1992: 6); not only in the seiz-
ing of Indigenous peoples’ lands and the appropriation of living Aboriginal bodies for 
use as an indentured workforce, but also in the theft of the corporeal remains of de-
ceased Aboriginal persons for sale or exchange on an international market. Indeed, the 
division of the stolen bodies of Indigenous Ancestors into “parts” for transport and col-
lection can be considered as an original forerunner of our contemporary control society, 
in which “Individuals have become ‘dividuals’, and masses, samples, data, markets or 
‘banks’” (Deleuze 1992: 5). Viewed from the perspective of colonized Indigenous peo-
ples, it therefore appears unsurprising that “the operation of markets is now the instru-
ment of social control and forms the impudent breed of our masters” (Deleuze 1992: 6), 
since the dehumanizing process of capitalization of/on human life (and death) has long 
been a defining practice of settler-colonialism as a pervasive form of control society that 
establishes itself and develops systematically through racial discrimination. 
 This highlights also how the market logic of control blurs the distinction between 
production and product, or between cause and effect. For example, racism is a formative 
influence in colonial networks and social systems, and at the same time structural dif-
ferentiation in terms of race is a produced effect of the network circulation of power and 
its consolidation through repetition in particular nodes or operations. Consequently, as 
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Neel Ahuja (2016: 27) has asserted, “racism must be understood not simply in its rhetor-
ical form as a set of moral infractions, but rather as an effect of the material formation of 
social relations and their imbrication in more-than-human networks of settlement and 
ecological reproduction”. The racialized/racist “subject” of a network control society is, 
then, certainly not a given (human) agent vested with the capacity to direct social pro-
gress towards a desired end, but rather is an emergent effect of a dynamic series of 
“metastable states coexisting in one and the same modulation, like a universal system of 
deformation” (Deleuze 1992: 5). In control society, writes Deleuze, “man is no longer 
man enclosed, but man in debt”, and indeed, the Indigenous subject of control is “never 
finished with anything”, always incomplete, lacking, permanently insufficient or defi-
cient, “disadvantaged”; forever required to insert him- or herself into government-
funded programs for socio-economic development in a continuous quest for self-
improvement through “states of perpetual metastability” (1992: 6, 4; see Cornell/Kalt 
2007). A control society is accordingly defined by its “limitless postponements” (Deleuze 
1992: 5), corresponding also with a distinct mode of juridical life involving the constant 
suspension of the law and the increased normalization of states of exception that be-
come the rule. Ruth Gilmore (2007: 28) similarly defines racism as “the state-sanctioned 
or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to prema-
ture death”. As Giorgio Agamben (1998) points out in his consideration and refocusing 
of the Foucauldian project, this juridico-political operation of exception is not a new 
phenomenon that now supersedes and replaces the models of sovereign power and dis-
cipline of earlier eras, but rather is an original and defining structure of biopolitical sov-
ereignty apparent throughout the ages of Western political society.  
 This claim by Agamben is especially persuasive when the long history of Western 
imperialism and the biopolitics of slavery are taken properly into account in attempts to 
theorize the nature of power and of political society. If, as Deleuze (1992: 6) asserts, “the 
disciplinary man was a discontinuous producer of energy, but the man of control is un-
dulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network”, then it is apparent that control has been a 
feature of human political society for a very long period of time. Indeed, one can only 
think of control as a new mode of dispersive and fragmenting political life arising in the 
twentieth century by remaining blind to the experiences of Indigenous peoples in set-
tler-colonial situations including Australia, Canada and Northern America, who have 
survived histories of legally-sanctioned displacement and forced migration from home-
lands and the extralegal dispersal of their ancestral remains and cultural property 
through global networks and information archives. The long human history of slave 
trade likewise exemplifies elements of social control, in which human life is defined 
principally in market terms and is subject to global dislocation through networks of 
productivity and purchase. Perhaps the newness of our contemporary control society 
concerns rather the complexity and the encompassing universality or reach of the net-
works in which we participate today as (racialized) subjects of the Anthropocene. In-
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deed, the climate refugee is emerging today as an exceptional mode of life that seems 
likely to become ever-more standard. And, as Ahuja (2016) warns, the emergence – or 
production – of this new kind of impoverished migrant subject is accompanied by an 
inevitable escalation of the mechanism of control that has its origins in colonial racism 
and today is evident in a prominent global discourse of “human security”. With veiled 
racism, this presents the climate refugee as a disruptive threat to the social order of 
wealthy “First World” nations, rather than properly expressing how the productive and 
wasteful activities of these same rich nations are the major contributors to the environ-
mental risks that create climate refugees in the first instance. 
In this context, liberal responses to climate change invoke ‘human security’ – a 
form of liberal imperialism that integrates militarized technologies into the gov-
ernment of environmental, biological and social systems. Despite the apparent in-
ternationalism of human security, which purports to transcend narrow national 
security agendas, this discourse is increasingly deployed as a form of governance 
integrating war and control. Combining network analysis, surveillance, policing, 
military intervention, and the statistical management of populations, economies 
and environments, human security activates a ‘posthuman’ biopolitical form that 
corresponds to Michel Foucault’s turn from discipline to security and to Gilles 
Deleuze’s conception of a control society […] In this modality of control, bodies are 
targeted not primarily through techniques of inclusion and exclusion, nor through 
subjectivation, but rather through the calculation of gradations of difference in 
population constructions. (Ahuja 2016: 28-29) 
If racism is thus reinscribed today, simultaneously as a formative aspect of contempo-
rary control society and as an effect of the biopolitical discourse of human security, then 
I have argued here that such developments should themselves be understood as emerg-
ing from an historical colonial racism. This is perpetuated in current settler-colonial so-
cial formations and through the globalized neoliberal imperialism that governs (or 
abandons) life in the era of the Anthropocene.  
 
Program 
According to Deleuze, control society “presents the brashest rivalry as a healthy form of 
emulation, an excellent motivational force that opposes individuals against one another 
and runs through each, dividing each within” (1992: 5). This feature complicates the 
orchestration of a viable program of resistance to the politics of control since, as Frida 
Beckman has remarked, “control society incorporates opposition and critique within 
itself” (2016: xxii, see also 2018). Rather than direct opposition, then, a viable program 
of resistance may require a strategic use of the force Agamben (2014) refers to as a 
“destituent power”, with the potential to render control systems “inoperative” by replac-
ing their generative conditions with creative substitutes that can materialize alternative 
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kinds of social and political structure. If, as I have argued following Deleuze, the “con-
stituent” logic of control society includes colonialism, racist dehumanization, dislocation 
and division, then an alternative logic of collaborative alliance encompassing situated 
practices of “becoming-human” and “excolonialism” may release “new forces knocking 
at the door” (Deleuze 1992: 4), enabling creative lines of escape from prevailing and 
pervasive conditions of control in settler-colonial societies. I have earlier elsewhere de-
fined “excolonialism” as an “exit from colonialism”, connoting a constitutive break from 
postcolonial societies of control.3 I use the prefix “ex” in “excolonial” in the same way 
that I would use it to describe an ex-partner: it describes a former relationship from 
which I have extricated myself, an ex-relationship that remains an inescapable part of 
my personal history and which has shaped me as the character I am today, but from 
which I have now qualitatively distanced myself. Excolonialism breaks with longstand-
ing colonial habits of engagement, opening up avenues for forming new styles of interac-
tion and relationship appropriately supported by bicultural or intercultural legal, politi-
cal, economic and social institutions. Whereas control society proceeds by “the brashest 
rivalry”, normalized by a neoliberal culture of conflict and competition, these new styles 
of engagement will be carefully collaborative and associative. Rather than engaging in a 
divisive or oppositional politics of combative resistance, partners in a transformative 
program of excolonialism will strive for mutual reward through respectful practices of 
selective agreement, which they will seek actively to orchestrate and institutionalize as 
the sanctioned structures of an excolonial public culture and society-in-the-making 
(Bignall 2014; Bignall 2019).  
 Deleuze characterizes “societies of control” in terms of a neoliberal tendency to-
wards social fragmentation and the radical splintering of collective life, exacerbated as 
processes of individualization extend to technologies of “dividualization” when subjects 
are commodified as data and dispersed through vast information networks. As we have 
seen, settler-colonial societies have long been characterized by a racist identity politics 
of white hyper-nationalism that extracts racialized data from individual Indigenous bod-
ies for the pathological constitution of a social order defined by varying and mobile 
echelons of privilege. Each stratum is distinguished as an intersectional modulation reg-
istering degrees of separation from a baseline category of Indigenous “disadvantage”. 
Consistent with this approach, settler-colonial policies addressing Indigenous “disad-
vantage” typically treat this as an individual pathology rather than a structuring colonial 
legacy, potentially remedied by individual efforts towards “gainful” employment and 
social “decency”. For example, successive renditions of Australia’s “Close the Gap” policy 
consider that apparently intractable measures of Indigenous social disadvantage will be 
reduced if Indigenous individuals make suitable personal choices that keep them out of 
                                                        
3 This term was first coined and defined in Bignall 2014. On discontinuous history as a (continuous) pro-
cess of exit, see Bignall 2010, chapter 6. See also Foucault’s (1984, 1986) writings on Kant and Enlighten-
ment.  
  
 
Coils of the Serpent 6 (2020): 111-28 
 
122 Bignall: Colonial Control 
jail, support their health, and enable a “normal” upbringing in an untroubled (nuclear) 
family life (e.g. Pholi/Black/Richards 2009). Settler-colonial societies have also long 
been characterized by a desire to erase persistent forms of Indigenous collectivity sup-
porting structures of self-governance, since these challenge the legitimacy of colonial 
sovereignty when this is based in spurious notions that Indigenous societies were “too 
primitive” to be considered as First Nations vested with aboriginal sovereignty and high-
ly developed systems of law. Likewise, the possibility that Indigenous Nations retain 
their original sovereignty, unrecognized by the British Colonial Office at the time of in-
vasion and settlement, contests the Australian Government’s claim to represent a united 
Australian people uniformly governed under its exclusive national sovereignty and the 
legal apparatus imposed at colonization. As a positive form for the future after colonial-
ism, excolonialism in Australia calls for a process of re-collectivization that affirms the 
postcolonial reality of legal pluralism and multiple polities. This is a prerequisite condi-
tion, enabling Indigenous and settler peoples to materialize a different method and pro-
cess of social constitution through an affirmative ethics of co-existence. Excolonialism 
calls for collaboration through complex sets of affective interactions in accordance with 
a political ontology that preserves difference and diversity as a creative condition of a 
genuinely shared social life, produced ethically as an equitable outcome of plural sover-
eign engagements.   
 Excolonial relations can accommodate both agreement and disagreement simulta-
neously, because excolonial agents understand each other as complex, mobile and mul-
tidimensional collectives; they interlace “bit by bit” in “piecemeal insertions” and selec-
tive encounters, and not in their respective entireties (Bignall 2014; Deleuze 1990: 237-
43; Deleuze/Guattari 1987: 504). Over time, cohabiting powers can learn to appreciate 
and affirm those aspects of their coexistence that bring mutual benefit (even if these are 
overall or by comparison very few or minor in nature), and to avoid or minimize interac-
tions where disagreement is trenchant and irresolvable. From selective engagements 
that bring positive affections and shared enhancement, further benefits might actively 
form over time. An approach to political identity as open, complex and shifting – and to 
social relations as partial, selective and piecemeal – gradually enables the incremental 
transformation of widespread hostility born from colonial control towards more amica-
ble forms of sociability built from alternative dispositions and forces of constitution. 
This future possibility requires that social partners will have sound knowledge of self 
and other, so that they can effectively decide how their relationship can best be orches-
trated to bring mutual benefit and avoid those aspects of their involvement that they can 
predict will diminish or destroy one or both. Importantly, whereas settler-colonialism is 
a form of control society that relies upon the erasure or dismissal of the sovereignty of 
First Nations peoples – abundantly evident in the practices of piracy described above – 
excolonialism proceeds through mutual regard when sovereign partners enter actively 
into orchestrated relations of understanding and agreement such as those found in suc-
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cessful treaty arrangements. At the same time, excolonial relations acknowledge the de-
termining right of each partner to refuse those aspects of engagement that threaten to 
harm or diminish them; excolonialism, then, incorporates a “politics of refusal”, recog-
nized by some Indigenous activists as fundamental to their strategic agenda (e.g. Simp-
son 2017). Excolonial practice requires the development of culturally relevant institu-
tions able to promote and protect these principles of sociality. For Indigenous peoples 
whose economies, social structures of self-governance and cultural archives have in 
many instances been devastated by the dispersing technologies of colonial control, re-
patriating processes of Indigenous Nation rebuilding are a crucial step towards identify-
ing, organizing and acting once more as self-governing entities (see Cornell 2015; 
Jorgensen 2007; Vivian et al. 2017). As future partners in a potential excolonial relation-
ship, it is fitting that settler-colonial powers will responsibly support Indigenous Nations 
as they strive to reclaim their sovereign capacity and rebuild institutions for the expres-
sion of their political authority as a prerequisite condition for self-determined, active 
engagement in excolonial relations. Indeed, excolonial-type strategies of Indigenous Na-
tion rebuilding already play a role in re-collectivization and associated efforts towards 
the dismantling and transformation of the exemplary form of control society that is set-
tler-colonialism (e.g. Rigney/Bignall/Hemming 2015).  
 Central to such efforts are strategies to counter the dehumanizing tendencies of de-
subjectivation that Deleuze (1992) also identifies as a key feature of a fragmenting and 
dispersive politics of control. The work of rebuilding self-determined and coherent 
forms of subjectivity for a reinvigorated humanity is both individual and collective in its 
nature and scope. For example, as she contends with the intimate presence of her own 
Aboriginal family’s traces in the imperial collections held by State institutions, Ali Baker 
writes about the authoritative and ethical task of “becoming human” she faces. For 
Baker, this is a means of repudiating the “anti-memorial and absence of honouring” she 
finds in “the debris of documents and objects scattered throughout institutions in dark 
places, documents of abuse and lies” that attest to the racist operations of colonial 
knowledge formation (2018: 6):  
When [the ethnographer Norman] Tindale chose to make a cast/bust of my great 
grandmother’s head, and place that cast within the museum collection, he objecti-
fied and abjectified her within the colonial archive in perpetuity. He used her head 
to stabilise the colonial identity in this place. Colonial objects like head casts or 
photographs are re-articulated acts of violence upon us, of what has already been 
done to us as Aboriginal people. They contain the evidence of how we have been 
“done over.” What happens then when these “objects” of study become human? 
When these objects of study become scholars and artists? We become human – be-
cause while our families and elders may have been denied a humanity by the Eu-
ropean invaders, our people never stopped being, were never frozen in time, were 
never plants or animals of a lower rung of a constructed false hierarchy, a hierar-
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chy created precisely to justify the stealing of land while allowing those who bene-
fited from the theft to feel good and righteous about it. (Baker 2018: 2) 
Accordingly, whereas settler-colonialism proceeds through the racist dehumanization of 
an Indigenous class treated as being without subjective agency, resulting inexorably in 
the institutionalization of a settler regime of inhumane political technologies of segrega-
tion and cultural assimilation, excolonialism depends upon shared – though differential 
– resistive processes of “becoming-human” through processes of self-assertion and ethi-
cal engagement. Whereas Indigenous peoples will “become-human” by reclaiming and 
rebuilding the subjective moorings destroyed by colonialism, the “becoming-human” of 
settler-colonial society involves the collective reconstruction of a new self-concept, con-
ceived on an alternative basis to the culturally biased model of superiority inherited 
from European Humanism. Accordingly, excolonialism certainly does not seek for “be-
coming-human” to reinstate the version of Humanism connected with anthropocentric 
European modernism and associated also with imperialist and racist programs of global 
“civilisation”, the subduing of nature and the “improvement” of “backward” peoples. By 
contrast, excolonialism calls for a mode of relational identification that counters the rac-
ist dehumanization central to colonial justifications. Specifically, it calls for an active, 
open and affirmative mode of comportment and association that joins partners in mutu-
ally beneficial relations that enhance their affective potentiality, enabling each to be-
come more complex and dynamic in their activities of relational self-constitution. Exco-
lonial partners will combine carefully in piecemeal and selective encounters that aim for 
mutual enhancement at recognized sites of shared agreement, while respecting resilient 
differences that define the specificity or uniqueness of each party and should not be de-
nied, erased or coerced into submissive sameness (Bignall 2014, 2010). While it resists 
the universalizing Humanism that is a defining feature of the European Enlightenment 
tradition, excolonialism is not an antihumanism but rather offers an alter-humanism 
that affirms the constitutive and creative power of difference in situated processes of 
relational identification involving diverse agencies, including nonhuman and environ-
mental agencies. Excolonialism is best considered in terms of an intercultural frame-
work that brings together Indigenous philosophical perspectives of “more-than-human” 
existence and ontological plenitude with non-Indigenous frameworks of Continental 
“posthumanism” (see Bignall/Rigney/Hemming 2016; Bignall/Rigney 2019; Braidotti 
2009; cf. Chandler/Reid 2019). That is, excolonialism is an intercultural ethical perspec-
tive for guiding positive transformations in complex affective orders that are conceived 
as fundamentally open and dynamic, formed through expansive relations and diverse 
ecological networks that both constitute and bind subjects in shifting structures of mu-
tual interdependency, collaborative agency and positive sociability.  
 Excolonialism proposes to break with the past for the sake of the future; but it does 
not claim that the past can be surpassed. Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples will 
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carry our colonial histories and crimes with us forever, and colonial legacies of systemic 
injustice have entrenched vastly uneven playing fields upon which our contemporary 
political struggles take place. If Indigenous authorities today are willing to partner in 
treaty with settler society and will tolerate a continuing settler presence on the ancestral 
lands that colonizing forebears have seized and degraded, the best we can do towards 
our recovery of a shared humanity is to create our futures on the basis of a different set 
of power relations. These must surely be motivated by an alternative spirit of engage-
ment and comportment enabling new forces of association that strive for reciprocity and 
parity in processes of negotiated consent. Micropolitical relations joining culturally di-
verse citizens in piecemeal civil engagements propel this kind of shift, which over time 
might incrementally consolidate a macropolitical order as the institutionalized habits of 
an excolonial society. Excolonial social transformation is a challenge we have scarcely 
begun, but for all that it is not a utopian or ideal endeavor. Excolonialism already exists 
as a minor or destituent force within every actual settler-colonial control society, dis-
persed through social networks and permanently apparent, exercised in a quotidian 
multiplicity of positive affects and mutually productive encounters. In his thinking about 
the epochal shift from disciplinary formations towards societies of control, Deleuze 
writes “there is no need to ask which is the toughest or most tolerable regime, for it’s 
within each of them that liberating and enslaving forces confront one another” (1992: 4). 
Even in the bleakest societies of control, the conscientious effort to engage others selec-
tively and affirmatively can release nonconforming social dispositions that, with repeti-
tion over time, may consolidate the structures of an alternate social formation. Con-
versely, the disposition towards control is a permanent danger for every social for-
mation; controlling tendencies may appear at any moment as a force of association that 
threatens to stifle and enslave in relations of domination. This, then, is why Deleuze 
(1992: 4) will insist that “there is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new 
weapons”. If colonial racism is a longstanding weapon of choice for the biopolitics of 
control, then in this essay I hope to have described excolonialism as a tool for posthu-
man liberation. 
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